

Greater Vancouver: *l'exception canadienne métropolitaine*

by

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The first thing to say about Vancouver in terms of the themes of metropolitan governance and 'seeking consistency in complexity' is that British Columbia's major metropolitan region is unlike the other city regions of Canada. Despite being Canada's third largest city region, Greater Vancouver is the essential 'odd-one-out' to the Canadian re-metropolitanization trend line of bigger is better. Whether in Halifax, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Calgary or Edmonton, and – perhaps – even Montreal, the Canadian experience is toward a more amalgamated, megacity model. In Greater Vancouver, this Canadian trend has yet to take hold; indeed it is being resisted. Metropolitan Vancouver remains 'l'exception canadienne metropolitaine.'

And one of the first things to add about metropolitan governance and the theme of "Linking Central (Senior) Government Politics and Metropolitan Initiatives" is that the constitutional order we work under is a product of the 1860's – when $\frac{3}{4}$ of Canadians lived in rural/agricultural settings and 'local' really WAS local – whether in building schools or maintaining public roads (with the exception of 'the king's highways'). Today, as noted in our most recent 2001 census, 80% of Canadians live in urban centres of 10,000 people or more, and rural population has continued to decline. More importantly, in terms of the interest of this conference, by 2001, almost 2/3rds (over 64%) of Canada's population, or about 19,500,000 people, lived in 30 census metropolitan areas (CMAs). (See Figure 1) Yet the constitutional order remains.


Finally, by the last 2001 census, 51% of Canada's population concentrated further in just four broad metropolitan regions – up from 49% in 1996):

- the extended/Toronto-centred Golden Horseshoe in southern Ontario;
- Montréal and environs;
- Vancouver/British Columbia's Lower Mainland and southern Vancouver Island; and
- the Calgary-Edmonton corridor. { Source: Stats Canada}

Figure 1.
30 Major Metropolitan/Urban Centres in Canada

	2001	Rank 2001	Rank 1996	Area ¹	Density ²
Toronto** (Ontario)	4,682,897	1	1	5,902.74	793.3
Montreal (Quebec)	3,426,350	2	2	4,047.35	846.6
Vancouver (British Columbia)	1,986,965	3	3	2,878.52	690.3
Ottawa–Hull (Ontario–Quebec)	1,063,664	4	4	5,318.36	200.0
Calgary (Alberta)	951,395	5	6	5,083.00	187.2
Edmonton (Alberta)	937,845	6	5	9,418.62	99.6
Quebec (Quebec)	682,757	7	7	3,154.35	216.4
Winnipeg (Manitoba)	671,274	8	8	4,151.48	161.7
Hamilton (Ontario)	662,401	9	9	1,371.76	482.9
London (Ontario)	432,451	10	10	2,333.37	185.3
Kitchener (Ontario)	414,284	11	11	826.98	501.0
St. Catharines–Niagara (Ontario)	377,009	12	12	1,406.2	268.1
Halifax (Nova Scotia)	359,183	13	13	5,495.54	65.4
Victoria (B.C.)	311,902	14	14	695.34	448.6
Windsor (Ontario)	307,877	15	15	1,022.53	301.1
Oshawa (Ontario)	296,298	16	16	903.23	328.0
Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)	225,927	17	17	5,192.22	43.5
Regina (Saskatchewan)	192,800	18	18	3,407.84	56.6
St. John's (Newfoundland Lab.)	172,918	19	19	804.63	214.9
Greater Sudbury (Ontario)	155,601	20	20	3,536.10	44.0
Chicoutimi–Jonquière (Quebec)	154,938	21	21	1,753.67	88.4
Sherbrooke (Quebec)	153,811	22	22	1,108.16	138.8
Barrie (Ontario)	148,480	23	29	897.46	165.4
Kelowna (British Columbia)	147,739	24	25	2,904.00	50.9
Abbotsford (British Columbia)	147,370	25	26	625.94	235.4
Kingston (Ontario)	146,838	26	23	1,906.82	77.0
Trois-Rivières (Quebec)	135,507	27	24	880.47	156.2
Saint John (New Brunswick)	122,678	28	28	3,359.61	36.5
Thunder Bay (Ontario)	121,986	29	27	2,548.16	47.9
Moncton (New Brunswick)	117,727	30	31	2,177.23	54.1
Source: Statistics Canada				¹ in km ²	² per km ²

Map 1: Canada's Metropolitan City Regions*





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
Source: http://www.canadainfolink.ca/canadian_cities.htm (September 3, 2004)

Figure 2. Canada's Five Largest Cities

Figure 3: Urban/Rural Population by Province



Map 2: Where Canadians Live



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Source: http://www.canadainfolink.ca/canadian_cities.htm (September 17, 2004)

**The Setting:
British Columbia and the Vancouver Metropolitan Region**

British Columbia is Canada's third most populous province – 4,147.4 million citizens (April 1, 2004)¹ - representing just over 13% (13.032%) of total Canadian (31,825,400) population². Despite being Canada's third largest province (948,600 square kms), 85% (about 3.548 million) of the provincial population resides in 154 incorporated municipalities encompassing less than one percent of provincial territory. Over half of the citizens of the province (2,383,268 million people – 57.5%) reside in the 'Lower Mainland' - comprised of two regional districts along the Fraser River Valley adjacent to Vancouver. This 'Lower Mainland', [bounded on the south by the U.S. border, on the north by mountains which extend virtually without interruption to Alaska, and on the east - at Hope, approximately 160 kms. away - by similar mountain ranges, with its western extremity, including the City of Vancouver, the gulf waters of the Pacific Ocean] represents the economic centre of the Province.³ Politically, the region elects just over half (50.7%) of the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Province. In Jacobs' terms, this Vancouver-centred 'Lower Mainland' forms one coherent 'city region'.⁴

Map 3: British Columbia: Municipalities/Regional Districts



Greater Vancouver is Canada's third largest metropolis. It is one of the four fastest growing urban areas in North America, Canada's fastest.⁵ The Greater Vancouver region has grown to over 2 million (2.127 million as of 2004)⁶ - It is the core of British Columbia's 'Lower Mainland'. The Vancouver census metropolitan area now essentially corresponds with the recently redefined Greater Vancouver Regional District.⁷ Established in 1967, the GVRD is now an amalgam of twenty-one municipalities and one unincorporated electoral area, covering 3250 sq. kms. The Greater Vancouver Region contains a little over half (51.3% - 2.127 million people) of the provincial population and a majority (6 of 9) of the largest (over 100,000 population) and 11 of 19 (over 50,000 population) local authorities in the province.⁸ For the May, 2005 B.C. General Election, this 'Lower Mainland' has 47 legislative seats (59.5%) and the Vancouver metropolitan region has thirty-nine of the seventy-nine legislative seats, 49.4% of the provincial total.

Map 4: Greater Vancouver Regional District



Whatever its substantial growth potential, the fastest growing areas in the Vancouver metropolis are in the Fraser Valley suburbs within and beyond the eastern boundaries of the GVRD. By 2025, for example, GVRD projections have the Greater Vancouver suburb of Surrey surpassing the central city Vancouver in population. [The City of Vancouver's population is now 560,000, close to neighbouring Seattle's 570,800.]⁹ Adjacent non-GVRD metropolitan/outer suburbs, such as Mission, Abbotsford/Matsqui and Chilliwack are the fastest growing areas in the province; and 'next door' municipality Abbotsford is 'in' the GVRD for its Parks functions.

One byproduct of the rapid growth of the Vancouver metropolitan area is that the ethnic makeup of the region's population has become increasingly multicultural; half of the public school population of Vancouver has English as a Second Language, for example; other municipalities are not far behind. This translates, increasingly, into politics around who will represent these communities. In metropolitan Vancouver, that has produced new representatives for the Indo-Canadian communities, and the first provincial representative from the Chinese community (in the May, 1996, BC General Election); others were elected in the 2001 BC election. The June, 2004 Canadian General Election also included an increased number of ethnic/visible minority community candidates as well.

In terms of the development of metropolitan Vancouver's economy, there has also been a growing dichotomy between the Lower Mainland and the rest of the province: much of the BC economy is resource extractive, with heavy reliance on logging, mining and fishing, and a limited manufacturing component. The economic base of the Lower Mainland, on the other hand, is increasingly service-oriented, with a strong reliance on personal and corporate services, including tourism, and province-wide distribution of goods and services.¹⁰ Combined with its significant internationalist population, a more interdependent - and internationally oriented - regional economy, and its Pacific port location [the Port of Vancouver is the second busiest in North America, and the busiest on the west coast of the Americas],¹¹ metropolitan Vancouver has become an 'international city,'¹² and the provincial economy has become even more internationalist.¹³

One additional factor that impacts on economic development decision making and intergovernmental relations in the Vancouver-centred region is the fact that most of the best arable land in the province is found in the Lower Mainland. Only one-quarter of the land in the province is suitable for any form of farming - and most of the prime agricultural land is in the Vancouver-centred region. Thus, the potential for policy conflicts and the necessity of devising regional solutions - including on cross border issues like air quality - to resolve urban development problems as part of any economic development strategy - domestic or international - become immediately apparent.¹⁴ Cross-boundary disputes such as the one created by recent plans for a Sumas II electrical generator in Washington State, approved after several rounds of hearings in Washington in 2002/3, suggest regional activity can be an irritant as well as cooperative.

The increasing nature of such trans-regional activity also demonstrates the need to look beyond existing territorial boundaries for 'metropolitan Vancouver' solutions: the Cascadia option - variously defined - has provided a new territorial – and institutional - dimension for problem solving on a range of economic, social and environmental issues. Examples such as the Cascadia Mayors' Council, which meets on issues of regional concern, from the regional environment to crime, and meetings of the three regional/metropolitan authorities for Vancouver, Seattle and Portland to develop metropolitan policy learning capacities attest to the growing interest in Cascadia-based solutions to regional policy dilemmas. As such, these also represent an inclination to develop capacity outside of more traditional local-senior governmental settings.

Themes:

In terms of brief comments on the theme of ***Levels of Management in Metropolitan Vancouver***, the regional district model, in place since the mid 1960's, has offered a fairly flexible and efficient form of management for the Greater Vancouver region. The combination of limited *mandated* functions and a long list of *voluntary* functions has left much to be decided locally/regionally; the approach has, until recently at least, worked fairly well for 'Vancouver'.

On ***Developing and Implementing Metropolitan Reforms***, two factors stand out in metropolitan Vancouver: first, the development of regional institutions was locally-inspired; secondly, the senior (provincial) governmental role largely has been what one commentator has described as 'gentle imposition'.

And on ***Coordinating Actors at the Metropolitan Level***, what has been a generally successful model of consensus decision-making, through the regional district's two tiered indirect election form, has begun to show signs of reaching its 'best-before date'. Tensions within, and critiques from outside the GVRD suggest a need to rethink the current form of coordination and governance for metropolitan Vancouver.

Finally, on ***Linking Central/Senior Government Policies and Metropolitan Initiatives***, an ability to adjust metropolitan boundaries to generally reflect population/growth patterns on the ground has helped in metropolitan Vancouver and reflected senior/provincial governmental support for regional capacity. As noted below, there has been a range of shifts in the Vancouver region's capacity to act independently: sometimes these have reflected an increase in metropolitan ability; in other, more recent, instances, it has been reflected in a re-assertion of senior (provincial) ascendancy.

There have been innumerable social and economic prognostications about the new millennium, but few on governance or global metropolitanization. Yet solutions to the problems of a now highly urbanized world will not occur without a reconceptualization of the future network of metropoli based on an assessment of some of the governance forms which have worked, those which have failed

and those which need to be tried. Can metropolitanization based on a dynamic governance process contribute to national well-being and to global sustainability, as Savitch and Vogel have concluded in their assessment of an emerging 'post-city age'?¹⁵ Sancton and Rothblatt think so: in their Revisit of Metropolitan Governance, they came to the conclusion that regional/metropolitan governing forms – and their attendant intergovernmental reforms - may provide the most helpful answers to the challenges of governance for the new millennium.¹⁶

This suggests a series of related questions:

- What are the comparative governance lessons for the 21st century across metropolitan city regional settings?
- What comparative lessons can be learned from the changes in metropolitan governance over the past five postwar decades of the 20th century?
- How have these changes occurred?
- What forms and outcomes have resulted?
- What have we learned about attendant local/regional - senior/central intergovernmental relations?
- Where are our 'best metropolitan practices'?
- Are there identifiable city-regional experiences and global threads on which to base a new metropolitan – and intergovernmental - reconceptualization for the 21st century?
- What has the metropolitan Vancouver experience contributed to this debate?

The notion of 'one size does not fit all' increasingly has become part of the discourse on metropolitan reform. Comparative studies of the metropolitan experiences over the last half of the 20th century offers the best possibility of identifying needed governance options for this still new century. Only then might there be real urban solutions to global problems.

This paper, on 'Greater Vancouver Experiences', poses the above questions for the metropolitan Vancouver region. Here, one conclusion is that despite a history of some considerable success - and indeed a perception that to date this has offered one best practice model - there are limits to the regional district system found in British Columbia; metropolitan Vancouver appears now past that limit.

As one of those who has argued for much of the last quarter century that regional districts and regional planning in British Columbia represents one of the most successful policy initiatives and governance forms, this conclusion may seem somewhat heretical. And the critique of Greater Vancouver's current governance model does not extend to all the other twenty-plus regional districts in the province; it is largely Vancouver specific.

The intention here is to make four simple points:

- governance matters - and its adaptability in the Vancouver city-region has been one of its strengths;
- regional districts in British Columbia - and earlier regional organizational forms - have worked well over all of the past almost ninety years; and in all but the largest metropolitan region, regional districts continue to provide an efficient, flexible and effective form of regional governance;
- in BC's largest Vancouver metropolitan region, an accountability crunch has come to challenge regional district efficiency arguments and claims. This might result in the conclusion that for metropolitan versus regional governance in British Columbia, 'one size does not fit all';
- what next, in metropolitan Vancouver at least, would appear to require legislative reform toward a new, more politically accountable Greater Vancouver Authority (GVA). That has implications for how senior governments and metropolitan initiatives might be linked.

RETROSPECTIVE:

The history of regional planning in metropolitan Vancouver is both long and short with a variety of regional authorities created, dating from near the beginning of this century. Initially, these represented 'ad hoc' (and often single purpose) responses to a number of local/regional service dilemmas. Almost without exception, the early regionalization experiences were premised on locally-perceived necessity. Actual 'regional' beginnings date from 1911, just 25 years after Vancouver's founding, when the City of Vancouver with its Point Grey, South Vancouver and Burnaby municipal neighbours formed the Burrard Peninsula Joint Sewerage Committee. The Committee funded a study which recommended "an ongoing co-operative response", and by 1914 had convinced the provincial government to pass legislation to create a Joint Sewerage and Drainage Board. Subsequent local action resulted in a regional Water District being created in 1926; this was followed by the establishment of four area health/hospital boards between 1936 and 1948.¹⁷

Modern regional structures best date following the Second World War: in 1948 - a year of significant flooding in the Vancouver-centred Lower Mainland/Fraser River Valley, amendments to the Municipal Act were passed allowing contiguous local authorities in a metropolitan region to develop a joint planning capacity. As a result, the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board (LMRPB) was formed the following year. It covered the whole physical region - from Vancouver, up the Fraser Valley to the mountains and Hope. In some ways this was a recognition - and extension - of a voluntary planning association (of Vancouver, Burnaby, Port Moody, Coquitlam, North and West Vancouver) created in 1937.¹⁸

Despite these various local initiatives, provincial action on regional government was slow. Tennant and Zirnhelt have persuasively argued that the proliferation and success of these early joint boards and authorities did lead the way to provincial consideration of more broadly-based regional solutions to urban

development problems, particularly with regard to their application in metropolitan Vancouver.¹⁹ The process of reform, they called “gentle imposition” by the province.

The thinking of W.A.C. Bennett's Social Credit provincial Government (first elected in 1952) was obviously affected by the early experience - and publicity - of metropolitan government reform in Toronto in 1954. As a result, community and regional planning provisions were added to the Municipal Act in 1957 which empowered the Minister to direct adjacent municipalities in 'Metropolitan Areas' to establish a joint committee "to study and report on such matters of an inter-municipal nature as shall be set out by the Minister...." The already established LMRPB was able to undertake such a process, leading to an official regional plan for the whole of BC's Lower Mainland by the mid 1960's. CHANCE AND CHALLENGE , the 'official regional plan', was approved in August, 1966; but as the LMRPB was moving toward this success, the provincial Government, perhaps feeling threatened by a jurisdiction representing half the province's population, determined that administrative and political diffusion was a more appropriate response.²⁰

Accordingly, a regional district system for the entire province was created between 1965 and 1967. As stated by then Municipal Affairs Minister Dan Campbell, the B.C. Government's intention was clear: "regional districts are not conceived of as a fourth level of government, but as a functional rather than a political amalgamation."

As a result, the Lower Mainland was divided into four separate regions. Within the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD - originally incorporated as the Regional District of Fraser Burrard on June 29, 1967), as elsewhere in the system, functions were of two types:

i) to carry out **mandated functions** from the province to the new regional districts. These mandated functions included general planning for the region as well as responsibility for governing of the hospital district. In Greater Vancouver, mandated functions also included Water Board and Sewage and Drainage District responsibilities.

ii) **voluntary functions** were the second category of responsibilities for the new districts. These voluntary functions were established by Letters Patent. They included 78 functions from A to W (ambulance and animal control to unsightly premises and weed control), and each district could choose the function it was to perform.²¹

In the 1970's, the new Greater Vancouver Regional District successfully completed a Liveable Region Plan (LRP). It set out growth planning ideas such as regional town centres and preservation of agricultural and green space which guided regional development into the 1980's.²² This continued despite the loss of formal planning authority in 1983 – through a direct provincial legislative intervention removing regional planning authority from regional districts due to a land-use dispute between the GVRD and the Province²³ - but by the 1990's, significant growth pressures confronted the region.

In metropolitan Vancouver and British Columbia, the response to regional growth management problems and issues of metropolitan democracy were to seek to build on the successes of prior regional agreements and form. In 1995, under a new left/NDP administration, new provincial planning legislation - a Growth Strategies Act - was passed for British Columbia. This legislation required municipalities to plan regionally²⁴ and allowed the province to establish mediative forms when local-regional agreement was not forthcoming. This new provincial legislation was the result of an extensive provincial-municipal consultative process which included consideration of other planning and governance models comparatively.

In 1995, the Greater Vancouver Regional District (with recently enlarged boundaries equivalent to the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area) arrived at the end point of a five year long local-regional process of consultation and discussion to establish a new Liveable Region Plan. This 'Creating Our Future' process produced broad agreement, one initial major suburban dissent - Richmond - and the possibility of the first use of the province's 'mediation to closure' procedures under the Growth Strategies Act. In early 1996, local-regional resolution of this dissent - and minor ones with Surrey and Langley Township - was arrived at without such provincial mediation. Greater Vancouver's 'Liveable Region Strategic Plan' (LRSP) was approved by the provincial government in Spring, 1996. Translating that 'on the ground' - with 'context statements' by the region's twenty-one municipal units is the current ongoing task.

Both the new BC provincial planning legislation and the GVRD's planning process/resolution spoke directly to arguments about metropolitan governance, local/regional-provincial intergovernmental relations and growth management reform, about the extent of "senior governmental interest or capacity" to address major urban issues²⁵, and suggestions that a 'consensual model', as exemplified by Greater Vancouver, was 'inherently weak, and suffered from a 'lack of mandate', lack of representation and 'an inability to achieve consensus on matters of specific policy'.²⁶ The Greater Vancouver and British Columbia experience of the early/mid 1990's suggested an alternative to metropolitan restructuring being pursued in other jurisdiction like Ontario - with Metropolitan Toronto Megacity, and the Greater Toronto Area, in Ottawa-Carleton, in Nova Scotia, with a new metropolitan Halifax, and elsewhere. The British Columbia experience also supported a notion of metropolitan governance as a clear alternative to metropolitan government, and to ideas such as "bigger is better."

That was then, and this is now: this paper now explores the more recent experience of British Columbia and metropolitan Vancouver and comments on the relationship between end of century restructuring forms such as the creation of a new Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (Translink), the creation of new provincial legislation – the Community Charter - and the arguments put forward in rethinking metropolitan government and governance for Greater Vancouver in the early 21st century.

CONTEMPORARY GREATER VANCOUVER: CHALLENGES NOT YET MET

I: Simply put, the first contention here that much of the success of regional planning in British Columbia has been tied to reform of local governing structures: whether in the 1940's with the provision that adjacent municipalities might begin to plan together establishing regional planning, through establishment of a first Municipal Act - and provisions for official regional plans in the 1950's or the creation of regional districts themselves in the 1960's, the first three decades of regional planning in BC were closely tied to structural - governance - reforms.

II: And it worked! It worked so well that regional planning did either commence or continue in the 1960's and 1970's, and perhaps more importantly, often continued (certainly in Greater Vancouver), albeit under a different guise, even when legally abolished in a provincial pique in the 1980's.²⁷ It did so largely because of a number of governance factors: as Richard and Susan Tindal have noted, "municipal government reform in British Columbia ... resulted in one of the most imaginative and flexible governing arrangements found anywhere in Canada. The regional structure allow(ed) existing municipalities to continue, with whatever communities of interest they represent(ed), provide(d) for the delivery of a variety of services by the regional authority, and avoid(ed) the bureaucratic build-up and duplication often associated with full-blown two-tier regional governments".²⁸

Former BC Municipal Affairs Minister Dan Campbell, that spokesperson on regional districts in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, argued consistently that regional districts were NOT regional governments, preferring a regional service delivery definition. Not all agreed: Donald Higgins, following the 'if it walks and quacks like a duck test', concluded that regional districts had indeed become regional governments.²⁹ Bob Bish came to the same conclusion more recently, but noted that the regional system in BC has allowed 'the division of responsibility - ... 'who does what' ... - between municipalities and the regional government (to be) made by the municipalities themselves."³⁰

That aspect, both local recognition of the value of - and often local initiation of - particular regional solutions and resultant local buy-in produced a positive regional experience of success often following success. It is a view largely shared by Andrew Sancton, even in the context of major urban-regions:

"Can a large city-region contain a number of municipalities, establish a regional-local government institution and avoid the pitfalls of two-tier municipal government? This is the biggest structural question facing urban government today..... All ... Canadian city-regions require an institution similar to the GVRD (Greater Vancouver Regional District): one that is comprehensive in territory and flexible in function. Such institutions do not require large bureaucracies. In fact, they will probably work best if they have no operational responsibilities at all. Their aim should be to provide a forum where regional issues can be discussed, to act as a catalyst for the creation of inter-municipal agreements and special purpose bodies and to enact planning documents with sufficient legal status to coerce municipalities into adhering to broad strategic objectives for the use of land."³¹

III: The questioning here is not of where we've been - which has been largely a positive policy, governance and intergovernmental experience, but where we're going - a much less certain future as BC's larger regional structures take on more and more responsibilities. It is not a rejection of the success represented by the past 50 years of regional planning and governance in British Columbia; rather, it is a query about whether that achievement of the last half century can endure into the 21st millennium. Current assessment is that increasingly citizens in BC's largest city-region, Greater Vancouver³² - have come to resemble Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid looking back at their pursuers and asking "who are those guys?" Citizens in the GVRD increasingly are wondering who is responsible for making more and more important and expensive decisions - on transportation, infrastructure, maybe policing and beyond, and almost certainly on taxation - and ask the same question as Butch and Sundance.

Perhaps this is illustrated nowhere more obviously than in the recent past with Greater Vancouver's Transportation Authority – Translink. In June, 1998, the second NDP/Clark Government initiated the *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority*.³³ Under this act responsibility for transportation and related services in metropolitan Vancouver was passed from the provincially-appointed British Columbia Transit to the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (now known as 'TransLink'). The Act mandated that TransLink and the GVRD 'work together to establish a mutually agreeable strategic transportation plan and growth management strategy.'³⁴ But while the provincial act legally established TransLink as a separate entity from the GVRD, the two organizations are joined in many formal and, most importantly, informal ways. For example, members of the GVRD hold twelve of the fifteen TransLink board positions.³⁵

The functional mandate of TransLink is to 'plan and finance a regional transportation system that moves people and goods efficiently and supports the regional growth strategy, air quality objectives and economic development of the Greater Vancouver Regional District.'³⁶ Provincial funding for TransLink's operations was approximately \$545 million dollars in 2000 and is to increase to over \$1 billion by 2009; TransLink was also given the ability to increase revenues through several other 'taxation' instruments - though in many instances, such as a vehicle levy, it needs provincial assistance to collect much of this revenue. The TransLink board's institutional image is one of an almost at-arms-length provider of management for the several subsidiary companies and programs it established under its jurisdiction. It describes its role or management style as 'steering not rowing.'³⁷

In creating GVTA/Translink, the province recognized that the needs of the Vancouver region were different from those of other regions in the province. BC Transit is a purely provincial entity under the supervision of the appropriate minister, Translink can be said to be a new addition to the family of local/regional administrative bodies in metropolitan Vancouver because its board is controlled by indirectly elected GVRD members. With that change in structure came a

corresponding change in function - in that the *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act* moved responsibility for the Vancouver area's transport into the hands of locally elected officials. Financially, the capacity to toll and tax - even if still needing provincial assistance on its collection in many instances – marked a change in the de facto financial power of those holding seats on the GVRD/GVTA as well.

In terms of efficiency and accountability, moving control over transit to a regional body continues the trend of decentralization begun in BC in 1997 that an optimist might describe as an attempt to unleash the innovational power of local officials and make transit more efficient. However in terms of accountability Translink has created a new problem; it has more fully empowered indirectly elected officials who are now two steps removed from their constituents. When the GVRD was primarily a forum where locally elected mayors and councillors could discuss and make voluntary agreements on issues such as regional growth there was little need for them to be directly elected. But now that these same officials are vested with the power to make decisions over service provision and taxation with little provincial supervision, a stronger argument can be made for more accountability such as through direct elections. This was demonstrated late in 2000 when Translink attempted to use one of its new revenue generating instruments to directly levy a vehicle tax. The proposed levy generated widespread public opposition from many different sectors and was ultimately abandoned when the Province of British Columbia refused to collect the new tax. This underscored the fact that while GVRD/Translink now has the jurisdictional capacity to impose such charges, they often lack the administrative capacity to collect such taxes. More importantly, the public outcry against the vehicle levy highlighted the ongoing regional accountability gap. This accountability gap became a ravine during the summer 2002 Vancouver bus strike; lasting over several hot summer months, no one could find any accountable politician at Translink which had turned management of its buses over to a subsidiary, Coast Mountain Bus Company Ltd.³⁸ The lack of an accountability oar to match the one intended for efficiency was clearly apparent.

This Vancouver metropolitan governance dilemma has had several impacts on linking senior governmental policies and metropolitan initiatives. Perhaps two recent examples illustrate this best: (1) the senior governmental pressure to ensure regional building of a rapid transit airport-to-downtown Vancouver link – the Richmond-Airport-Vancouver (RAV) line, as part of senior (Federal and Provincial) efforts for the 2010 Winter Olympics; and (2) the clash between the values of local initiatives/home rule included in the new BC Community Charter Act and subsequent provincial legislation, re-asserting its jurisdictional ascendancy with the Special Projects Streamlining Act.

On the RAV line decision-making, after considerable local lobbying to get transportation planning authority from the province, the GVRD finally achieved this goal in mid-1998. Coupled with the development of the land-use based

LRSP in 1996, and earlier efforts, such as the Long-Range Transportation Plan for Greater Vancouver (*Transport 2021*³⁹ - a joint GVRD/BC project) which reported in September, 1993, the intention was that metropolitan Vancouver would be able to plan for both metropolitan land-use and transportation aspects as the region saw fit.

The regional plan (the LRSP) was clearly set out – for both land use and transportation. It did not include a RAV link in the early stages – certainly not before one additional cross-regional link – and a subsequent spur to the Northeast was completed. Then came the decision – promoted particularly by the provincial and federal governments - to award Vancouver the 2010 Winter Olympics. Both senior governments came offering additional funds for the RAV-line, with provincial support tied to a P-3 option, unlike the two prior lines' public enterprise aspect. The \$'s offered by the senior governments were substantial; and it was tied to RAV going ahead of regionally-defined rapid transit needs.

As a case study in linking senior and metropolitan initiatives, RAV tells much about the lack of change in BC. The new rapid transit 'skytrain' RAV-line addition was costed at \$1.5billion. The federal government came to the table with between \$300-\$450million, the province with \$370million, an anticipated private builder/operator and the region picking up the rest.⁴⁰ In spite of the clear desire of both levels of senior jurisdiction to have the RAV line built in time for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, the regional authorities (GVRD and Translink) had serious reservations about the proposal. Their concerns were threefold:

- the P-3 requirement imposed by the provincial government
- the question of anticipated cost-overruns – particularly for a tunnelled section in the city of Vancouver – and the fact that these would have to be covered by metropolitan taxpayers
- the fact that the RAV-line itself was not the top transit priority as identified by more than a decade of discussion within the greater Vancouver region.

That combination of local/regional concerns led to a Translink decision (7-5) on May 7, 2004, “not to precede work on the RAV line due to projected cost overruns.”⁴¹ Provincial disappointment in the metropolitan authorities' decision led the Premier to announce on June 15, 2004, that British Columbians collectively would cover any cost overruns as well as contribute \$170million to the RAV-delayed Northeast Skytrain connector. On June 18, 2004, Translink again defeated the RAV proposal with a 6-6 vote.⁴²

The province's new Transportation Minister, Kevin Falcon, MLA for Surrey (Greater Vancouver's 'second city', south of the Fraser River, announced that the provincial \$'s were lost for RAV/Transit and would instead be used to twin suburban portions of the Trans Canada Highway and twin the Port Mann Bridge crossing the Fraser River into the older inner suburbs and the City of Vancouver –an area of considerable private auto congestion for his constituents and those beyond in government-friendly municipalities beyond. Such a proposal ran completely counter to a more than a decade of land-use and transportation

planning by the region.⁴³ The combination of senior governmental \$'s and overt political pressure resulted in an unprecedented third vote on the same issue. The result was that the senior governmental priorities trumped regional policy decisions – with a vote of 8-4. RAV is to be built; regional priorities were altered

On the clash between the new *Community Charter* legislation and the *Special Projects Streamlining Act*, the juxtaposition of competing values is just as stark: the *Community Charter Act* (Bill 14), 'commenced' January 1, 2004; it set out its purpose in language recognizable to at least some advocates of modest home rule; for Canadian urbanists, BC's *Community Charter* legislation also includes language which students of Section 92-8 recognize as maintaining provincial jurisdictional oversight potential; American local governance observers might simply recognize this as *Dillon's Rule Lite* – or '*Home Rule Extra Lite*.'

This is clearest in the purposes of the new *Community Charter*:

Purposes of Act

- 3 The purposes of this Act are to provide municipalities and their councils with
- (a) a legal framework for the powers, duties and functions that are necessary to fulfill their purposes,
 - (b) the authority and discretion to address existing and future community needs, and
 - (c) the flexibility to determine the public interest of their communities and to respond to the different needs and changing circumstances of their communities.⁴⁴

The principles of the Act sound closer to local autonomy/home rule advocates' views. They reflect a stated desire to clarify both the municipal and the provincial components of the provincial-municipal relationship in British Columbia, and, potentially, to add to local autonomy:

**BILL 14 – May, 2003
COMMUNITY CHARTER**

HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, enacts as follows:

Part 1 -- Principles, Purposes and Interpretation

Principles of municipal governance

- 1 (1) Municipalities and their councils are recognized as an order of government within their jurisdiction that
- (a) is democratically elected, autonomous, responsible and accountable,
 - (b) is established and continued by the will of the residents of their communities, and
 - (c) provides for the municipal purposes of their communities.
- (2) In relation to subsection (1), the Provincial government recognizes that municipalities require
- (a) adequate powers and discretion to address existing and future community needs,
 - (b) authority to determine the public interest of their communities, within a legislative framework that supports balance and certainty in relation to the differing interests of their communities,
 - (c) the ability to draw on financial and other resources that are adequate to support community needs,
 - (d) authority to determine the levels of municipal expenditures and taxation that are appropriate for their purposes, and
 - (e) authority to provide effective management and delivery of services in a manner that is responsive to community needs.

Principles of municipal-provincial relations

- 2 (1) The citizens of British Columbia are best served when, in their relationship, municipalities and the Provincial government
- (a) acknowledge and respect the jurisdiction of each,
 - (b) work towards harmonization of Provincial and municipal enactments, policies and programs, and
 - (c) foster cooperative approaches to matters of mutual interest.

- (2) The relationship between municipalities and the Provincial government is based on the following principles:
- (a) the Provincial government respects municipal authority and municipalities respect Provincial authority;
 - (b) the Provincial government must not assign responsibilities to municipalities unless there is provision for resources required to fulfill the responsibilities;
 - (c) consultation is needed on matters of mutual interest, including consultation by the Provincial government on
 - (i) proposed changes to local government legislation,
 - (ii) proposed changes to revenue transfers to municipalities, and
 - (iii) proposed changes to Provincial programs that will have a significant impact in relation to matters that are within municipal authority;
 - (d) the Provincial government respects the varying needs and conditions of different municipalities in different areas of British Columbia;
 - (e) consideration of municipal interests is needed when the Provincial government participates in interprovincial, national or international discussions on matters that affect municipalities;
 - (f) the authority of municipalities is balanced by the responsibility of the Provincial government to consider the interests of the citizens of British Columbia generally;
 - (g) the Provincial government and municipalities should attempt to resolve conflicts between them by consultation, negotiation, facilitation and other forms of dispute resolution.

The language hides as much as it illuminates, however: for example, despite talk of limiting interference by the senior provincial authority, should local governments under BC's *Community Charter* decide to raise local taxes – such as on businesses – rather than opt for the newly-preferred user-fees and the like, the province reserves the right to impose limits on property tax rates – in direct contradiction of the *Community Charter's* 'empowering local autonomy' intent. And under a re-defined provincial-municipal relationship, the *Community Charter* reminds local governments that apart from acknowledging and respecting each other's jurisdiction, the legislative intent is to "work towards harmonization of provincial and municipal enactments, policies and programs."⁴⁵ This may work in many instances, but not where a local government wishes to take a rather divergent policy tack. Here, the intergovernmental game becomes more perilous for local authorities.

The dismissal of school boards in BC and the 'over a weekend' order-in-council elimination of the GVRD's authority over the region's watershed when it tried to block provincial implementation of a natural gas pipeline through that watershed to Vancouver Island, serve as historical reminders of senior provincial powers.⁴⁶ The more recent provincial overturning of a local governmental (Delta) bylaw to limit negative air quality impacts of large greenhouses by requiring them to utilize natural gas or propane vs. wood waste,⁴⁷ and the use of similar provincial powers (Right To Farm legislation) to prevent local coastal municipalities from using their bylaw powers to limit possible negative environmental impacts from fish farms, and the provincial 'return' of fines to fish-farm operators continue to serve as current reminders that constitutional authority does matter when significant policy differences arise between local and provincial players.⁴⁸

Perhaps most stunningly, in the era of the new *Community Charter* is BC's Bill 75, the *Significant Projects Streamlining Act*, introduced and passed in just three weeks in November, 2003; it allows the provincial government to override any

local governmental opposition on any project deemed of significant provincial interest.⁴⁹ Over half of the UBCM member municipalities passed motions condemning Bill 75. Then-Minister of State for Deregulation Kevin Falcon noted that the Act was to 'cut red tape', 'remove unnecessary and costly delays' and 'create new economic activities'. Run out of the Premier's Office, the Special Projects initiative produced an official, highly critical UBCM response:

The UBCM Executive is shocked by the degree of intrusion of this legislation into local affairs. It allows any Minister ... to replace any local government bylaw, plan, regulation, policy, etc. to Facilitate the approval or development of a "provincially significant project". Cabinet can make that determination without any prior notice to the local government or the community. The Community Charter... promised us recognition as an independent, accountable and responsible order of government.... The Community Charter touted public accountability and openness but Bill 75 replaces local, publically developed plans (including those developed through public hearing processes) with fiat from the provincial Minister.

We recognize there is a need to balance local and provincial interests.... This is just not the way to achieve it.

The Executive is calling on the provincial government to remove local government from Bill 75.⁵⁰

Similar school board experience in several of Ontario's largest cities in the latter period of Harris/Eaves Tory rule mirror these lessons. If the test is in puddings, it would appear necessary to go back to basic recipe ingredients on local empowerment and accountability and start again in British Columbia.

2004 also started as 2003 had – with the province again showing a disregard for local decision-making: in another example of provincial interference in local affairs, local police forces found out on Dec 30th, 2003 that ALL bars and restaurants in BC would be allowed to stay open until 4AM on Dec 31/03 - Jan.1/04. The provincial Liquor Control and Licensing Act was amended in late 2002 allowing for this change but it was not implemented. Local police forces first learned of it less than 48 hours before its impact, resulting in expensive overtime/shift changes – all costs borne by the municipalities. The provincial legislation over-rides municipal by-laws and even when the changed hours were decided by the provincial agency, no one informed municipal/policing officials until they found out the day before; the reason given by the province for this oversight: the legislation 'did not require' notification to local governments.⁵¹

CONCLUSIONS

The Regional District system that has worked admirably for the last 50 years may well continue to provide a highly successful and flexible model of decision-making for another half century in most regional districts in BC. Even in the Capital Region/Victoria - if Bish is correct - this may remain true, though the Province of Nova Scotia thought not for the Halifax region, a metropolitan region equivalent in size to Victoria's capital region.⁵² And Mike Harris' Ontario - in Toronto, Ottawa Carleton, Hamilton Wentworth, Sudbury and beyond - came to the same conclusion.⁵³

In metropolitan Vancouver, increasingly the crunch has come. The GVRD and related regional authorities such as Translink increasingly lack the mandate to take regional decisions without an appropriate political accountability base. For 26, and probably 27, of BC's regional districts, as William Shakespeare noted, "past is prologue."⁵⁴ For Greater Vancouver, it is probably simply past.⁵⁵ That leaves the question, "what next?" If not now, then very shortly, the Province of British Columbia and the GVRD/GVTA will be forced to recognize that accountability concerns may overwhelm the considerable regional successes of the past century in our largest metropolitan district. It will be Butch Cassidy and Sundance Kid public reactions to new regional charges/taxes for regional services that will tip the balance. That may come with GVTA/Translink improvements; it may result from higher charges for the more traditional range of services such as water or parks; or it might be precipitated by financial pressures toward regional policing (and other public safety) services. With a new right-wing provincial government/agenda, it could also be pushed by a substantial downloading of social service responsibilities as occurred in Mike Harris' Ontario. Whatever the back-breaking straw, the regional camel in metropolitan Vancouver will increasingly be under structural pressure and citizen scrutiny over its governance.

That should not seem surprising. There is a central debate about accountability in public governance. On one side, the argument is made that accountability is one half of an equation - the other side being efficiency. Governance theorists such as Peter Self have contended that the relationship between accountability and efficiency is zero sum: as you add to one, you subtract equally from the other. Self further asserted that the relationship between accountability and efficiency is the central dilemma in public administration; it is also a dilemma which has grown considerably more complex with time.⁵⁶ Certainly, all governments in the late 1990's and now the '00's (oughties?) are under increased pressure on the efficiency side. For regional districts in large urban settings in British Columbia, however, there is now need for more accountability.

The most obvious 'what next' in terms of improving accountability for Greater Vancouver - the only regional district over 500,000 in population and the only region with multiple municipal units over 100,000 - is democratic electoral reforms. That might imply a shift to a new, directly elected Greater Vancouver Authority. This has already been suggested.⁵⁷ In Spring, 1998, a Report on MAKING LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY WORK IN BRITISH COLUMBIA recommended "the creation of a Greater Vancouver Authority, with a directly elected Greater Vancouver Assembly and a Regional Mayor elected across the whole region." The Report noted that "with ... eleven municipal units of 50,000 and more (and) more than half of these at or over 100,000 population size, a shift to direct elections would appreciably enhance local-regional accountability."⁵⁸ Greater London, after Margaret Thatcher's STREAMLINING THE CITIES annihilation of the GLC and six other MCC's, have had forms of regional authority re-established - like the GLA; part of the rationale is to provide a broader regional

structure to compete more effectively internationally ("Who Represents 'London'?" vs. "Who Does What?"). For Greater Vancouver, the international dimensions of regional governance reform would be a significant collateral benefit.⁵⁹ Britain's New Labour reforms creating a Greater London Authority suggest both regional AND international benefits.⁶⁰

Democratic reforms to Greater Vancouver could include other electoral notions as well: these might include broader electoral system changes including, if direct elections were introduced, some form of proportional representation; it should include electoral expense/spending limit reforms,⁶¹ and it would involve a clearer disentangling of who does what. Bill 31, the Local Government Statutes Amendment Act (1998) recognized local government as an independent, responsible and accountable order of government. Subsequent unilateral action by the province on cuts to municipal grants generally and on required skytrain technology in Greater Vancouver rather suggested a continued senior governmental paternalism versus legislative efforts to make local governments both more independent AND accountable in BC. The policy failures of NDP Municipal Affairs Ministers Jenny Kwan, Jim Doyle and Cathy McGregor suggest more pessimism than optimism on the reform front. As (then) Deputy Premier Joy MacPhail said - to the agreement of NDP leadership colleagues in early 2000 - on municipal accountability reform "we chickened out."⁶² The new Liberal administration has done no better. On October 2, 2004, Translink Directors criticized the "province's unilateral approach to regional transportation planning." Their concerns reflected the stance of Transportation Minister Kevin Falcon "to consult (the region) but ... then push ahead with the (highway/bridge twinning) project."⁶³

Certainly, equally important to international benefits of regional governance reform, would be the accountability benefits of renewed Greater Vancouver governance. Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid had to jump off a cliff into a river to avoid their initial pursuers and then were "done in" in Bolivia trying their standard venture. If Translink directors, like Butch and Sundance, cannot swim or speak Spanish, they should consider renting the movie for the next GVRD/GVTA meeting to see the outcome of ignoring the increasingly obvious public accountability concerns. In the end, neither learning to swim nor speaking Spanish would have saved Butch and Sundance; more will be required of Translink and other regional authorities.

Finally, it is arguable that with a clearer link to its regional citizenry, metropolitan Vancouver might be better able to resist senior governmental pressures and blandishments – at least where these threats and inducements ran counter to policies determined by, and for, the region itself.⁶⁴ In its past, one of the great successes of local-regional interests and institutions in the Lower Mainland has been the ability to anticipate and recognize the need for change; failure to do so now - or in its short-to-intermediate-term future - may threaten the longer-term prospects for another fifty years of regional planning and governance success.

¹ Ministry of Finance, Province of British Columbia, BC STATS, April 1, 2004 @ <http://bcstats.gov.bc.ca> (accessed August 6, 2004).

² Ibid.

³ See David Bond, "Sustaining the Metropolitan Economy" in P.J. Smith, H.P. Oberlander and T.Hutton, eds., *URBAN SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS: VANCOUVER - CANADA - HABITAT II*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Centre for Human Settlements, 1996), Ch 12, pp.68-71. See also Tom Hutton, "The Innisian Core-Periphery Revisited: Vancouver's Changing Relationships with BC's Staple Economy", in *BCSTUDIES*, vol.113, Spring 1997, pp.69-100.

⁴ H. Peter Oberlander and Patrick J. Smith, 'Governing Metropolitan Vancouver: Regional Intergovernmental Relations In British Columbia', in Donald Rothblatt and Andrew Sancton, eds., *Metropolitan Governance: America/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives*, University of California, Berkeley/Institute of Governmental Studies, Berkeley, California, (1993), pp.329 -73.

⁵ The Canadian Decennial Census of 1991 confirmed the Vancouver CMA as the third largest metropolitan region in Canada, and the 29th largest in North America. It remained so in 1996 and 2001. [In comparison, the Toronto metropolitan region, Canada's largest, is 8th in North America; Vancouver's neighbour Seattle is 19th.]

⁶ BC STATS, Canada, 2001 Census, Statscan: Ottawa, 2002 and www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/data/pop.pop.htm; accessed August 6, 2004.

⁷ In July, 1995, Maple Ridge and Pitt Meadows - 1996 population, 75,000 - were formally added to the GVRD. They had previously been members for water/sewers (both) and parks (Maple Ridge only). Langley Township and Langley City - 1996 population, 106,395 - had also joined the GVRD in 1989. All current population figures from BC STATS, a division of the Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, Province of British Columbia. Only Abbotsford, outside the GVRD, continues to participate in GVRD functions - for Parks. The adjacent Fraser Valley regional District population for 2003 was 256,462. www.gvrd.bc.ca/publications/ (accessed August 6, 2004)]

⁸ Ministry of Finance, Province of British Columbia, BC STATS, April 1, 2004 @ <http://bcstats.gov.bc.ca> (accessed August 6, 2004).

⁹ Statistics Canada, 2001 Canadian Census, Ottawa, (2002); "About Vancouver" at www.city.vancouver.bc.ca and Seattle, Datasheet, (City of Seattle, 2002) at www.ci.seattle.wa.us. (both accessed Sept.11, 2002).

¹⁰ On the changes in the Lower Mainland and BC economies see M. Howlett and K. Brownsey, "British Columbia: Public Sector Politics in a Rentier Resource Economy", in Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett, eds., *THE PROVINCIAL STATE: POLITICS IN CANADA'S PROVINCES AND TERRITORIES*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992), pp. 265-295; and P.J. Smith, "British Columbia: Public Policy and Perceptions of Governance", in James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds, *CANADIAN POLITICS*, (Peterborough: Broadview, 1994), pp.506-526 and current stats from BC's Ministry of Finance, e.g., BC STATS, September, 2002

¹¹ For a more extensive discussion of this, on Vancouver, see P.J.Smith, "The Making of a Global City: Fifty Years of Constituent Diplomacy: The Case of Vancouver", *CANADIAN JOURNAL OF URBAN RESEARCH*, vol.1, no.1, June, 1992, pp.90-112. On the significance of the Port of Vancouver, see also David Bond, "Sustaining the Metropolitan Economy" in P.J. Smith, H.P. Oberlander and T.Hutton, eds., *URBAN SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS: VANCOUVER - CANADA - HABITAT II*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Centre for Human Settlements, 1996), Ch 12, pp.68-71.

¹² See, P.J.Smith and T.H.Cohn, "International Cities and Municipal Paradiplomacy: A Typology For Assessing the Changing Vancouver Metropolis", in Frances Frisken, ed, *THE CHANGING CANADIAN METROPOLIS: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE*, (Berkeley, Ca: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 1994), vol.2, Ch.19, pp.725-750.

¹³ See Theodore Cohn, David Merrifield and Patrick Smith, ' North American Cities in an Interdependent World: Vancouver and Seattle as International Cities', in Earl Fry, Lee Radebaugh and Panayotis Soldatos, eds., *The New International Cities Era: The Global Activities of North American Municipal Governments*, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, (1989), 73-117 and Theodore Con and Patrick Smith, "Constituent Diplomacy Policy Determinants In British Columbia: Developing A Global Region In The Pacific NorthWest", *BC STUDIES*, no.110, Summer, 1996. See also BC Stats, (Victoria: Ministry of Finance, 2002).

¹⁴ On recent efforts to develop a strategic plan for Greater Vancouver see Patrick Smith, "Urban Governance and Growth Management: Greater Vancouver and British Columbia" in P.Smith, et.al., *Urban Solutions To Global Problems:...* op. cit., pp.156 - 168 and P.J. Smith and H.Peter Oberlander, "Restructuring Metropolitan Governance: Greater Vancouver - British Columbia Reforms", in *Metropolitan Governance Revisited: American/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives*, (Berkeley, CA: IGS Press, University of California, 1998), pp.371-406..

¹⁵ H.V. Savitch and Ronald K. Vogel. eds., *Regional Politics: America In A Post City Age*, (Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage/Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, #45, 1996).

¹⁶ Andrew Sancton and Donald Rothblatt, eds., *Metropolitan Governance Revisited: American/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives*, (Berkeley, CA.: IGS Press, University of California, 1998).

¹⁷ Unless otherwise indicated, material for this historical section is taken from H. Peter Oberlander and P.J. Smith, "Governing Metropolitan Vancouver: Regional Intergovernmental Relations in British Columbia", in Donald N. Rothblatt and Andrew Sancton, eds., *METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE: AMERICAN/CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES*, (Berkeley, Ca.: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, Berkeley, 1993), pp.329 - 373.

¹⁸ See, for example, Robert North and Walter Hardwick, "Vancouver Since the Second World War: An Economic Geography", in Graeme Wynn and Tim Oke, eds., *VANCOUVER AND ITS REGION*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), pp. 200-233; and 'Case Three: Land Use Planning and Policy-Making' in Oberlander and Smith, op.cit., pp.356-366.

¹⁹ Paul Tennant and David Zirnhelt, "Metropolitan Government in Vancouver: The Politics of 'Gentle Imposition' ", *CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*, vol.16, Spring, 1973, pp.124-38

²⁰ Conflict over land use - between the provincial government and the LMRPB, and, at times, the LMRPB and local municipalities, contributed to provincial thinking on regional diffusion in the Lower mainland , and on regional districts in general. (See Oberlander and Smith, "The LMRPB and Regional Planning" in op. cit., pp.358-59.)

²¹ See *STATISTICS RELATING TO REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS IN B.C.* (Victoria: Province of B.C., June 1989), p.3 for a full list of these voluntary functions.

²² On this, see, for example, H. Peter Oberlander and Patrick J. Smith, "Governing Metropolitan Vancouver: Regional Intergovernmental Relations In British Columbia", in Donald Rothblatt and Andrew Sancton, eds., *METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE: AMERICAN/CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES*, (Berkeley, CA.: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 1993), pp.329-373.

²³ On this see, Warren Magnusson, et.al, *THE NEW REALITY: THE POLITICS OF RESTRAINT IN BC*, (Vancouver: new Star, 1984).

²⁴ See H. Peter Oberlander and P.J. Smith, "Restructuring Metropolitan Governance: Greater Vancouver – British Columbia Reforms", in Donald N. Rothblatt and Andrew Sancton, eds., *METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE REVISITED: AMERICAN/ CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES*, (Berkeley, Ca.: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, Berkeley, 1998), pp.373-406.

²⁵ Frances Frisken, "Metropolitan Change and the Challenge To Public Policy", Introduction in F. Frisken, ed., *THE CHANGING CANADIAN METROPOLIS*,(Berkeley, CA.: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California Press, 1994), pp.1-35.

²⁶ *GREATER TORONTO: REPORT OF THE GTA TASK FORCE*, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, January, 1996) Golden and her GTA Commissioners, did note that differences in regional political culture helped explain the relative success of 'consensual decision-making' in the Greater Vancouver case. The GTA Task Force general conclusions, however, were that such an approach was 'weak'.

²⁷ For a discussion of this see H.Peter Oberlander and Patrick Smith, "Governing Metropolitan Vancouver: Regional Intergovernmental Relations In British Columbia", in Donald Rothblatt and Andrew Sancton, eds., *METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE: AMERICAN/CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES*, (Berkeley, CA.: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 1993), pp.329-73; see also Warren Magnusson et. al., eds., *THE NEW REALITY*, (Vancouver: New Star, 1984).

²⁸ Richard and Susan Tindal, *LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CANADA*, 4th edition, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1995), pp.123-24. More recently, Tindal and Tindal have noted the continued benefits of this flexibility but have argued that accountability concerns have increased in prominence: "The regional districts have proven to be a flexible structure for dealing with a variety of considerations. They have assumed direct responsibilities for ... municipal services ... in unorganized areas. They have also acted as the administrative agency for certain functions or projects which some of their member municipalities wished to pursue jointly. In addition, they have assumed responsibility for various functions delegated to them by their constituent municipalities.... (But while) the flexible structure of the regional districts allows diversity and preserves a sense of community, ... accessibility concerns exist.", *Ibid.*, 5th edition, (Toronto: Nelson, 2000), pp.142-43.

²⁹ See Don Higgins, *URBAN CANADA: ITS GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS*, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977) and *LOCAL AND URBAN POLITICS IN CANADA*, (Toronto: Gage, 1986).

³⁰ Robert Bish, "Evolutionary Alternatives for Metropolitan Areas: the Capital Region of British Columbia", *CANADIAN JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE*, vol.23, no.1, 2000, pp.73-88.

³¹ Andrew Sancton, *GOVERNING CANADA'S CITY-REGIONS: ADAPTING FORM TO FUNCTION*, (Montreal: IRPP, 1995), pp.98, 100. The GVRD employed over 1000 in 1998, and prior to the addition of the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority - Translink - function, had a budget of more than \$350million. On this see, Alan Artibise, *REGIONAL GOVERNANCE WITHOUT REGIONAL GOVERNMENT*, Report for

the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, April, 1998, p.13. More recently, Sancton has referred to MERGER MANIA as THE ASSAULT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT (Westmount, Que: Price-Patterson, 2000).

³² There are just eight of the twenty-eight regional districts (RD's) with (2001 census) populations over 100,000: Comox-Strathcona RD at 101,000 - largest municipality Comox, 30,000; Fraser-Fort George RD at 103,000 - largest municipality Prince George, 78,000; Thompson Nicola RD at 123,000 - largest municipality Kamloops, 79,000; Nanaimo RD at 126,000 - largest municipality Nanaimo, 73,000; Central Okanagan RD at 142,000 - largest municipality Kelowna, 93,000; Fraser Valley RD at 231,000, largest municipalities Abbotsford, 110,000/Chilliwack, 63,000; Capital Region RD at 330,000 - largest municipalities Saanich, 105,000/ Victoria,77,000; and Greater Vancouver RD, now 2.13 million, with 6 municipalities over 100,000 Delta, 100,571, Coquitlam, 122,696, Richmond 174,201, Burnaby, 205,261, Surrey, 390,145 and Vancouver 568,442; another 5 Greater Vancouver municipalities are over 50,000 – Langley Township, 91,359, North Vancouver District, 85,839, , Maple Ridge, 71,399, New Westminster, 59,426 and Port Coquitlam, 57,308. See Patrick Smith and Kennedy Stewart, MAKING LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY WORK IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, Report 2: REFORMING MUNICIPAL ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY, for the Ministry OF Municipal Affairs and Housing, British Columbia, June 1998, pp.41-42 and <http://www.gvrd.bc.ca/populations/file.asp?ID=293> (accessed September 22, 2004 re 2003 populations).

³³ Kevin Ginnell and Patrick Smith, "Habitat @ 25: Lessons (still) From Vancouver", paper for the United Nations General Assembly Special Session for the Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Habitat Agenda, New York, June 2001, 32pp..

³⁴ Clive Rock, Translink Manager, Simon Fraser University presentation, February, 2001.

³⁵ The other three board seats were provincial MLA's, appointed by the government; at the end of the NDP era (May, 2001) these MLA's were not attending meetings and under the new Liberal government these positions have not been filled.

³⁶ Translink: 2001.

³⁷ Clive Rock, Translink Manager, Simon Fraser University presentation, February, 2001.

³⁸ Jonathon Fershau, Muddling Through Urban Regionalism: Rational Actors, Arenas without Rules, and Transportation Governance in the Greater Vancouver Regional District, Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, 2003.

³⁹ *TRANSPORT 2021: A LONG-RANGE TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR GREATER VANCOUVER*, (Burnaby: GVRD, September, 1993), 86pp.

⁴⁰ See, for example, www.encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/RAV%20line (accessed September 17, 2004)

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ See, for example, Janet Steffenhagen, "RAV foes promote light rail line", *Vancouver Sun*, June 21, 2004.

⁴⁴ Bill 14 - *Community Charter Act*, Third Reading, 4th Session, 37th Parliament © May, 2003 (Proclaimed May 29, 2003): Queen's Printer, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.

⁴⁵ Bill 14, the Community Charter, "Principles of the Provincial-Municipal Relationship", Part 1, Sec 2.

⁴⁶ On this example, see Smith and Oberlander, (1998), op. cit.

⁴⁷ See Derrick Penner, "Tomato King cheers right to burn wood: Court overturns bylaw that restricted growers fuel – Delta bylaw 'set undue restrictions' ", *Vancouver Sun*, April 19, 2003, pp.C1-2. In this case the Municipality of Delta had passed a bylaw to provide some local controls of large (e.g. in this case 18 acre) greenhouse operations, in particular their use of less-clean fuel sources for heating. The BC Government intervened when a Grower challenged the bylaw, citing Right to Farm legislation over the right of a municipality to legislate on local businesses. The province also argued that the local bylaw contradicted the provincial Waste Management Act which exempts agricultural operations. Urban-Rural issues of this sort are not new to Delta, a Vancouver suburb. In the late 1980's and 1990's, Delta held the longest land use dispute hearing in Canadian history over efforts by to develop farmland for urban use. The debates over the so-called Spetifore lands near the Tsawassen ferry terminal to Vancouver Island initially led to the Bill Bennett Social Credit government abolishing regional planning in 1983 when the GVRD initially prevented development plans by a Delta Social Credit supporter. The Minister of Agriculture/Fisheries has since precluded use of local bylaws to prevent/regulate coastal fish farms in BC as well.

⁴⁸ On such fish farms issues, see, for example, Charlie Anderson, "Auditor-General to look into return of (fish-)farm fines" after a complaint by the Sierra Legal Defence Fund; *The Province*, February 15, 2004, p.A6.

⁴⁹ See, for example, "Bill 75, the Significant Projects Streamlining Act, introduced November 3, 2003 at www.gov.bc.ca and www.dogwoodinitiative.org/SignificantProjectsStreamliningAct.htm (accessed Dec 9, 2003). The Act was given Royal Assent Dec 2, 2003. (www.civicnet.bc.ca, accessed February 14, 2004).

⁵⁰ Union of BC Municipalities Press Release, Frank Leonard, President, November 7, 2003. Accessed Feb. 14, 2004.

⁵¹ CKNW News, December 30, 2003. "Police caught unaware by legislation change on opening hours" Dec 30, 2003 ;(CKNW/AM980) -- Surrey RCMP are scrambling after discovering that bars and restaurants can stay open until 4AM on New Year's Eve under a little known and fairly recent piece of legislation. RCMP spokesman Constable Tim Shields says the Liquor Control and Licensing Act was amended late last year and because it's provincial legislation it overrides municipal bylaws. Shields says the RCMP just became aware of it Tuesday and now they're scrambling to extend shifts saying the detachment has to be pretty light on it's feet and change the operational plan to keep the members working until at least four or five in the morning. Under the legislation, any bar or restaurant can stay open until 4AM on New Year's Eve only if it makes food available.

⁵² On the 1995 creation of a new consolidated Halifax Regional Municipality, see, for example, Andrew Sancton, "Reducing Costs By Consolidating Municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Ontario", CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, vol.3, no.3, 1996, pp.267-89; A. Sancton, MERGER MANIA: THE ASSAULT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, (Westmount, Que.: Price-Patterson, 2000 - since re-published by McGill-Queen's University Press)), pp.89-101 - on Nova Scotian changes; Ken Meech and Rudy Vodicka, "Hindsight Is 20/20: Planning For Amalgamation In The Halifax Regional Municipality", CORDILLERA INSTITUTE JOURNAL, vol.1, no.1, 1997; and Dale Poel, "(Not) Thinking Regionally: Citizen Responses To Municipal Consolidation", Canadian Regional Science Association paper, Montreal, November, 1999.

⁵³ On the Toronto merger, see, FOR EXAMPLE, Anne Golden and Enid Slack, "Urban Governance Reform in Toronto", in Eran Razin and Patrick Smith, METROPOLITAN GOVERNING: CANADIAN CASES, COMPARATIVE LESSONS, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University of Jerusalem), forthcoming 2005; on recent changes in Ottawa-Carleton, see Caroline Andrew, "Evaluating Municipal reform in Ottawa-Gatineau: Building For a More Metropolitan Future?", in same volume.

⁵⁴ William Shakespeare said that (in THE TEMPEST, Act 2, Scene 1, line 261: "What is past is prologue".)

⁵⁵ I said that.

⁵⁶ See Peter Self, ADMINISTRATIVE THEORIES AND POLITICS, (Boston: Allyn and Unwin, 1977), Chapter 8.

⁵⁷ See Patrick Smith and Kennedy Stewart, MAKING LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY WORK IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, Report 2: REFORMING MUNICIPAL ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY, for the Ministry OF Municipal Affairs and Housing, British Columbia, June 1998, pp.47-49, "A Greater Vancouver Authority Option".

⁵⁸ See P. Smith and K. Stewart, "Local Democracy and Local Government: Policy Impediments And Legislative Reform Proposals - British Columbia Cases, British Lessons", MAKING VOTES COUNT conference paper, Vancouver, May, 2000.

⁵⁹ On the international aspects of a renewed regional authority, see P.J.Smith, "The Making of a Global City: Fifty Years of Constituent Diplomacy - The Case of Vancouver", CANADIAN JOURNAL OF URBAN RESEARCH, vol.1, no.1, June 1992, pp.90-112; and Caroline Andrew and Patrick Smith, "World Class Cities; Can - or Should - Canada Play?", in C.Andrew, P.Armstrong and A.Lapierre, eds, WORLD CLASS CITIES: CAN CANADA PLAY?, (Ottawa; University of Ottawa Press, 1999), pp.5-25.

⁶⁰ On the Tony Blair regional governance reforms in the London region see also Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR LONDON: ELECTING THE LONDON MAYOR AND THE LONDON ASSEMBLY, (London: LSE Public Policy Group, June, 1998).

⁶¹ See P. Smith and K. Stewart, "Local Democracy and Local Government: ...British Columbia Cases, British Lessons", MAKING VOTES COUNT conference paper, Vancouver, May, 2000.

⁶² On this, see, for example, Patrick Smith and Kennedy Stewart, "Up The Policy Stream Without A Champion? Local Democratic Legislative Reform In British Columbia: 1991-1996 and 1996-2001", BC Political Studies Association paper, Victoria, May, 2000.

⁶³ See William Boei, "Victoria's traffic plans upsets some mayors", *Vancouver Sun*, Oct.2, 2004, p.B9.

⁶⁴ In October, 2004, a leaked federal cabinet document indicated that the last \$150million contribution from Ottawa for RAV was to be 'hidden' from other provinces by calling it an Olympic contribution, even though it was coming from the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund – a fund for ALL provinces to share , based on population. See Frances Bula, "Secret plan to explain federal RAV funds: Cabinet document reveals Ottawa's attempt to hide \$150million", *VANCOUVER SUN*, Oct.4, 2004, pp.A1-2. The need to confirm all federal \$'s was tied to the P-3 requirements/bidding required by the province.