DO RESPONSIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY MATTER AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL?

The 17th-18th of May 2016

Institut national de la recherche scientifique, INRS Centre Urbanisation Culture Société,
385 Sherbrooke Est, Montréal, H2X 1E3
ROOM 2109

Colloquium organized by:
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Presentations by

Sandra Breux
INRS Urbanisation Culture Société

Jerôme Couture
INRS Urbanisation Culture Société

Jack Lucas
University of Calgary

Michael McGregor
Ryerson University

Andrew Sancton
University of Western Ontario

Zachary Spicer
Brock University

Fanny R. Tremblay-Racicot
Temple University

Commentaries by

Laurence Bherer
Université de Montréal

Anne Mévellec
University of Ottawa

Alison Smith
Université de Montréal

General conclusion by

Ruth Dassoneville
Université de Montréal

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Do Responsiveness and Accountability matter at the municipal level?

In theory, two processes guarantee the principle of democratic representation: the responsiveness of elected officials to citizens’ preferences on the one hand and accountability on the other (Gerstlé, 2003). Thus, in practice, elected representatives should implement the preferred policies of voters. Voters, for their part, should reward or punish elected representatives based on the following criterion: The correspondence between the performance of government action and citizens’ expectations is the key element of the democratic representation. The election is the preferred institution for providing this match. For the national level, some studies have shown how the balance between these two processes and the principle of democratic representation is realized (Petry, 1999; Stimson et al., 1995; Erickson et al., 1993; Lax and Phillips, 2012).

Opposite conclusions have been drawn for the municipal level. With regard to the responsiveness of elected representatives, this level of government presents too many economic, political or legislative constraints to achieve a balance between citizens’ preferences and the policies adopted (Gerber and Hopkins, 2011; Leigh, 2008; Nivola, 2002; Petersen, 1981; Rae, 2003; Self, 2003). For some researchers, if and when such a balance exists, it can be attributed to fiscal federalism (Tiebout, 1956) or else to structural constraints and historical weight (Collin and Hamel, 1993). However, these conclusions could be easily challenged due to their speculative nature, as they are not based on actual measurements the preferences of voters at the municipal level (Troupstine, 2010). This observation is relevant in light of a 2014 study by Tausanovitch and Warshaw, who demonstrate that the responsiveness of elected officials at the municipal level is undermined because voters at that level are considered to be, among other things, sensitive to the budgetary investments and changes made during the mandate of the elected official.

A similar debate exists on the topic of accountability at the municipal level. For Elmendorf and Schleicher, voters take little account of the performance of local officials, namely because that level is characterized by a lack of information available to citizens. Such an information-deficient context favours incumbents, in that voters tend to vote for the candidates they know the most about, which is the incumbent in this case (Oliver and Ha, 2007). Thus, their choice veers to the name of the representative they know, favouring the formation of a political monopoly (Trounstine, 2008). However, based on the performance of municipalities as evaluated by citizens using an indicator, there is no advantage to incumbents who had a good performance (Boyne et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the probability of being re-elected is greatly reduced when performance was considered weak, and becomes practically zero when it is considered poor. Moreover, other researchers have unveiled the existence of a link between the spending cycle of elections and the re-election of local governments. Specifically, increased spending ahead of elections favours the re-election of the outgoing municipal government (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008; Drazen and Esclava, 2010; Aidt et al., 2011; Sedmihradská et al.; 2011; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2014).
Commentators

Laurence BHERER  
*Université de Montréal*

Laurence Bherer is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Montreal. Her research mainly deals with participatory democracy and urban policies. Her current research projects focus on the professionalization of public participation and on the structuring of municipal politics.

Anne MEVELLEC  
*University of Ottawa*

Anne Mévellec is an Associate Professor at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her research focuses on the sociology of territorial public action in Canada, and in particular on the formation and professionalization of municipal officials. In that context, she explores the profiles, backgrounds and practices of elected officials as well as municipal political parties, the representation of francophones outside Quebec and the role of elected officials in forest governance.

Alison SMITH  
*Université de Montréal*

Alison Smith is a PhD Candidate in political science at l’Université de Montréal. Her PhD research is regarding the governance of homelessness in large Canadian cities. She will begin as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto in 2017.

Conclusion

Ruth DASSONEVILLE  
*Université de Montréal*

Ruth Dassonneville is an assistant professor at the department of political science at Université de Montréal and a member of the Centre for the Study of Democratic Citizenship. Her main research interests are voting behaviour, economic voting, election forecasting and electoral dealignment. Her work has been published in amongst others Electoral Studies, European Journal of Political Research, Party Politics and the International Journal of Public Opinion Research.
MAY 17th

Opening words and greetings

9:00 Greetings
9:30 Introduction

Accountability and responsiveness at local level: theoretical perspectives.

Sandra BREUX
INRS-UCS

Sandra Breux is an Assistant Professor at the Centre Culture Urbanisation Société of the INRS (Institut national de la recherche scientifique). Over the years she has developed a research area on the Canadian municipal level. Her research interests focus on municipal representative democracy and the role of territory on individual behaviour. She is also interested in notions of urban design and housing as well as in innovative methodological approaches.

Abstract

The purpose of the introductory message is to set bases for the conference’s subject Responsiveness and Accountability and to examine it’s implications at the municipal level in the Canadian context.
First Session: Discussing political parties

10:00  Sins of the Brother: Partisanship, Family Dynasty and Accountability in Toronto 2014

Laura STEPHENSON  
The University of Western Ontario

Michael McGREGOR  
Ryerson University

Michael McGregor is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University. His scholarly interests include a variety of questions related to the study of elections and electors at the federal and municipal levels in Canada. He is the Principal Investigator of the Toronto Election Study, a SSHRC funded examination of the attitudes and behaviour of voters and non-voters in the 2014 Toronto municipal election.

Aaron Moore  
The University of Winnipeg

Abstract

Perhaps no institutions have become so closely identified with elections as political parties. These organizations are known to have a significant impact upon the way that citizens view and participate in the political process. As Dalton (2002, 125, 126) notes, political parties “define the choices available to voters” and “shape the content of election campaigns.” Parties also provide the institutional resources for candidates to successfully appeal to voters, in the form of a brand name and economies of scale in campaign efforts (Aldrich 1995).

Moreover, the attachments that voters form with parties are vital to understanding electoral behaviour. One of the simplest cues individuals use to inform their vote choice is a candidate’s party affiliation. If a candidate is part of the incumbent party, any blame or credit for the conduct and policies of the previous administration becomes part of the information voters can use to determine their vote preference. Partisanship can also colour how citizens evaluate past government performance, biases our interpretations of performance (Duch et al. 2000). Thus, elections can be used to hold politicians accountable for the actions of other individuals from the same party, but partisanship can influence our evaluations of these actions.

What happens in non-partisan contests, however, when party cues may be unavailable? Most municipal elections in Canada are contested by individuals, rather than parties. This makes the case of Canada interesting, as Canadian voters have experience with partisan politics at the provincial and federal levels, as well as non-partisan contests municipally.

This paper considers the effect of party ties upon accountability in non-partisan elections, asking several questions. Do voters perceive partisan ties, even in officially non-partisan elections? If par-
tisan ties are recognized, do they influence retrospective evaluations of incumbents? Finally, do retrospective evaluations factor into vote choice, even in the absence of an incumbent candidate? The answers to these questions provide insight into the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable in non-partisan contests.

We investigate these issues in the context of the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election, using data from the Toronto Election Study, a large-N survey of Torontonians conducted around the time of the election. We first analyse how non-partisan the contest really was, then test whether partisan ties led to biased evaluations of incumbent performance. We then consider how the linking of candidates by partisan ties affected the outcome of the election. This election was unique because it was extremely high profile, the candidates had varying degree of partisan ties, and, although there was no incumbent candidate, the former mayor’s brother ran for office, creating a quasi-partisan scenario. Voter attitudes towards the new candidate may therefore have been shaped by attitudes towards the outgoing mayor, in a manner similar to how party labels might influence attitudes. This election thus presents a rare opportunity to explore several important dimensions of the relationship between partisanship and accountability in a non-partisan setting.


Jérôme COUTURE INRS-UCS

Jérôme Couture has a background in political science and is presently a postdoctoral fellow, under the supervision of Sandra Breux, at the INRS (Institut national de la recherche scientifique). His thesis is about municipal elections in Quebec. He is also a specialist in quantitative methods, which he has been teaching for four years at Laval University.

Abstract

According to the mainstream conception of the democratic theory, responsiveness and political accountability are the two main criteria for examining the implementation of voter preferences by elected officials (Gerstlé, 2003). For example, at election time, voters either reward or punish elected officials on the basis of accountability, in other words, on the degree to which their performance has met their expectations. Thus, elections figure as the main mechanism for negotiating or expressing accountability. The partisan model of political competition inspired by the work of Downs (1957) is commonly regarded as useful for understanding this mechanism. According to this model, political parties, as they vie for power, develop their political agendas to align with voter preferences. At election time, voters can then choose between different alternatives. In this context, the electoral supply depends on the presence of political parties. Candidates for elected office are representatives of a party and are selected through procedures such as open primaries and nominations from party members, or by being put on lists that are submitted directly to the voters.
For the partisan model to work at the local level, the elections taking place there should be in line with those of the other levels of government. This leads to a so-called “nationalization” of local elections where the national parties present candidates for municipal elections (Parodi, 2004). This type of election then features parties or coalitions whose “left” or “right” positions are relatively well known to the voters. Yet, such a direct link between the political offer at the municipal level and those of other levels of government does not exist in Canada.

The purpose of this paper is to answer three questions related to the responsiveness of elected officials and political accountability in the context of municipal elections in the province of Quebec. One, how might we gain an understanding of the responsiveness of elected officials to the preferences of voters in a municipal political landscape characterized by the virtual absence of political parties? Two, do voters respond more to the performance of elected officials in such a context? And three, does this political accountability take the form of an electoral punishment or reward for the incumbent?

We will show that it is possible to understand responsiveness in a context lacking political parties by resorting to the citizen-candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Starting from a logistic regression analysis of Quebec’s 2009 municipal elections with regard to the re-election of incumbent mayors (n = 384), we show that voters responded to changes made to the tax rate during the election year. The marginal effect showed that elected officials who decrease the tax rate saw their probability of being reelected increase by 32% compared to those who did not change the tax rate in a context of absence of political parties. Thus, voters rewarded incumbent mayors who significantly reduced the tax rate. At the same time, voters did not necessarily punish incumbent mayors who had increased the tax rate. However, voters in a partisan context were shown to punish incumbent mayors who significantly increased the tax rate. In this case, the marginal effect indicated that elected officials who increased the tax rate were faced with a decrease of their re-election probability by 49% compared to those who did not significantly vary the tax rate. Yet, in that same context, voters did not reward incumbent mayors who decreased the tax rate.

11:00 Coffee break

11:15 Commentary by Laurence Behrer

11:45 Open discussion

12:00 Lunch on the premises
Second Session: Discussing the career and function of elected officials

13:30  Responsiveness, Accountability, and the Local Political Career in Calgary and Edmonton

Jack LUCAS  
*University of Calgary*

Jack Lucas is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary. He studies institutional and policy change in Canadian cities, with a focus on urban political authority, urban policy institutions, and the long-term development of multilevel governance and the local state in Canada. He also has theoretical interests in comparative political development and historical political science. He teaches courses on urban politics, urban governance, Canadian federal and provincial politics, and political institutions.

**Abstract**

Elected local politicians are at the core of our theories of responsiveness and accountability in Canadian municipalities. The preferences and goals of these politicians – their hopes for re-election, their ambitions to “move up” to political careers at other levels of government, their understanding of municipal office as part-time service or a full-time career – all help to shape how they will respond to constituent preferences and the extent to which they can be held accountable for their decisions while in office. By focusing our attention on the political career (Docherty, 2011; Tremblay and Stockemer 2013) – an aspect of municipal government that has largely been neglected in Canada (Lucas 2015) – we can learn a great deal about the practical operation and development of accountability and responsiveness in Canadian municipalities.

In this paper, we present a comparative analysis of the long-term development of local political careers in the Canadian cities of Edmonton and Calgary. Drawing on information in local archives in both cities, we are currently completing a dataset containing basic information on everyone ever elected to municipal office since the time of incorporation (1894 in Calgary, 1904 in Edmonton). We will then combine this new dataset on municipal political careers with data on provincial and federal elected representatives from the Canadian Elections Database, a comprehensive dataset on Canadian provincial and federal elections developed by Anthony Sayers at the University of Calgary. This new local careers dataset – to our knowledge, the first of its kind in Canada – will enable us to answer three sets of research questions about local accountability and responsiveness in Canadian municipalities:

- What is the nature of the municipal political career and how has it developed over time?
- What is the typical length of a councillor’s or mayor’s career? What proportion of incumbents are defeated, and how has the local “incumbent advantage” changed over time? Are careers distinctive in Calgary and Edmonton, or do careers in the two cities follow the same overall trajectory?
- What is the role of the municipal political career as part of a politician’s broader career trajectory in Canada? What proportion of municipal politicians also serve at the provincial or federal levels? How has this changed over time?
What do we learn from the long-term development of municipal careers in Canada about local responsiveness and accountability? Do local politicians’ career paths suggest that they face adequate incentives to respond to their constituents’ preferences? How have these incentives changed over time?

To answer these questions, we will undertake three analyses. We will begin with descriptive statistics on the local career similar to those used by one of us in a previous study of local careers in a mid-sized Ontario city (Lucas 2015). We will then compare and categorize local careers using a sequence analysis technique known as optimal matching – a technique that is well suited to the comparative study of political careers (Aisenbrey and Fasang 2010, Abbott and Tsay 2000, Lucas 2017). Finally, to illustrate and expand upon the findings of the statistical analyses, we will examine a handful of particularly important or typical political careers using more historical and qualitative research techniques. Taken together, we believe that this paper will serve not only to provide valuable historical and contextual background for the other papers in the colloquium, but will also contribute directly to our understanding of responsiveness and accountability in present-day Canadian municipalities.

References


Andrew Sancton, a native of Montreal, received his Honours BA from Bishop’s University in Quebec and his doctoral degree in Politics from Oxford University. Most of his academic career has been spent as a Professor of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario in London. He was an expert witness in both the Toronto and Montreal court cases that unsuccessfully challenged the municipal amalgamations in those cities. His latest book is the second edition of Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective, published in 2015 by Oxford University Press Canada. His article “What is a Meeting? Municipal Councils and the Ontario Ombudsman” is in the September 2015 issue of Canadian Public Administration.

Students of urban politics have frequently observed that incumbent councillors in non-partisan local elections are almost invariably re-elected. For example, in 2014 in the City of Toronto, where there are 44 council seats, 36 of 37 incumbents who were running were re-elected, even at a time when there was no incumbent running for mayor and when the mayoral victor (John Tory) was quite a different type of politician than his predecessor (Rob Ford). The main caveat to the customary observations about the incumbent advantage is that incumbents who have drawn negative attention to themselves while in office are likely to be easy prey for challengers. This leads to the conclusion that the optimal incumbent strategy for electoral longevity is to avoid negative publicity at all costs.

Such publicity might involve personal misbehaviour and/or the taking of political positions that are manifestly unpopular. In the 2014 Ontario municipal elections in the cities of Greater Sudbury and London only seven of 26 incumbents were returned to office. The common factor among those who were defeated or who did not run was that most had contested the Ontario ombudsman’s position that informal meetings of small groups of councillors were “illegal closed meetings” of the council and/or one or more of its committees. The ombudsman’s findings about such meetings were widely reported in the local media in both cities.

In another paper I have analyzed the ombudsman’s position. In this proposed paper I aim to analyze its political implications. My argument is that the elections demonstrated that media and voters were paying close attention to findings of an apparently authoritative figure that groups of councillors had acted illegally by meeting together to “lay the groundwork” for decisions relating to council business. In this sense, it is clear that the electoral system did indeed hold incumbents responsible for actions that were apparently inappropriate. The ombudsman himself and local media were quick to underline this point.
But what was lost in the finger-pointing frenzy about “secret meetings” was that, until the ombudsman first declared in 2007 that informal meetings of some municipal councillors could in fact be “illegal closed meetings”, there was no Ontario law, regulation, or judicial determination that related to such informal meetings. The ombudsman’s findings were generally accepted at face value, as though it was perfectly obvious that municipal councils could not be accountable and transparent if some councillors discussed municipal business with each other outside council meetings.

Many people have argued that municipal councils would be more accountable in Ontario if elections were contested by organized political parties such that a party (or coalition of parties) could potentially govern in a way that is similar to parliamentary systems or to municipal systems in major cities in Quebec and British Columbia. These systems are all based on the premise that elected politicians talk with each other outside formal meetings about what they are going to do. It appears that incumbents in Greater Sudbury and London were punished electorally for doing precisely what we expect politicians at other levels of government to do. How can this advance the cause of municipal accountability?

14:30 Commentary by Anne Mévellec

15:00 Open discussion

15:15 Coffee break
Zachary Spicer is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Brock University, where he teaches and researches local government, public policy and public sector management. His research has been featured in a number of academic journals, including the Journal of Urban Affairs, Canadian Public Policy, and Canadian Public Administration. His first book, The Boundary Bargain: Growth, Development and the Future of City-County Separation will be released by McGill-Queen’s University Press in 2016.

Municipal governments in Canada are increasingly showing interest in inter-municipal cooperation and contracting (Spicer, 2015; Slack, 1997; LeSage Jr., McMillan and Hepburn, 2008; Sancton, James and Ramsay, 2000). Research has shown that municipalities are sharing a variety of services, including vital services such as the delivery of water and emergency services (Spicer, 2014). For the most part, municipal governments view inter-municipal collaboration as a method of increasing service efficiency, avoiding duplication and maximizing often-scarce local resources. These arrangements are usually the result of formal, legal contracts outlining the responsibility and financial obligation of each partner.

Often overlooked in the discussion of such collaborative relationships are concerns related to accountability and transparency. How involved is the public in creating these agreements? How aware is the public about the source of servicing within their communities? How committed are municipal officials to providing services outside their jurisdiction by contract?

This paper will introduce a framework to measure accountability and transparency in inter-local relationships and test it with a brief case study of inter-municipal cooperative agreements collected from the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), as defined by Statistics Canada. The Toronto CMA has a total of 27 municipal governments, covers nearly 6,000 square kilometers and is home to 5,583,064 people. In total, 132 agreements were signed within the CMA within the study period (1995-2013).

Building from the Governance Assessment Tool (GAT) introduced by Skelcher, Mathur and Smith (2005), this paper uses a modified criteria to assess inter-local agreements within the Toronto CMA along three fronts: public access, internal governance and accountability. The criteria are available below, in Box 1. I employ a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 is indicated if a criterion is met, 0.5 if it is partially met and 0 if it is not met. This provides the scale for each agreement a maximum of 15 points.
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A. Public Access

BOX 1: Modified Governance Assessment Criteria
1. Are agreements available to the public? 2. Are provisions made to have public meetings? 3. Are the public entitled to see reports regarding performance? 4. Is a contact provided in the agreement? 5. Are the public entitled to see minutes of meetings?

B. Internal Governance

C. Accountability
1. Does the partnership have to prepare an annual report? 2. Does the partnership need to prepare
an annual budget? 3. Is the partnership subject to external audit? 4. Does the partnership describe who represents each community? 5. Does the partnership describe who is financial responsible for service delivery?

Overall, the agreements tested score very low on the accountability scale, with few provisions available for public access or internal accountability. I highlight what I refer to as the “accountability and transparency gap” in local inter-municipal contracting. I argue that inter-local cooperation shifts traditional lines of decision-making, which reduces fiscal and servicing transparency, ultimately leaving residents in the dark about the source of local servicing and blurring the chain of fiscal and administrative accountability. Additionally, I argue not enough is being done to make the details of these agreements publicly accessible, which worsens the problem of local transparency during inter-local service sharing and contracting. These problems, however, can be reversed and I provide

16:00 **The responsiveness issue and the blurry lines of accountability in the case of regional transportation planning, governance and finance: Evidence from Toronto and Chicago**

**Fanny TREMBLAY-RACICOT**

*Temple University*

Fanny R. Tremblay-Racicot is a recent Temple graduate from the Ph.D. program in Urban studies. Originally from Québec City, she received her B.A. and M.A. in Political science from Laval University. Her doctoral research compares the effects of institutional reforms on the planning process, transportation investments and land use decisions within Chicago and Toronto from 2001-2014, while also assessing their characteristics in terms of accountability, democracy and effectiveness. Her research interests include regional governance, sustainable transportation, and urban and environmental policy.

**Abstract**

The planning, funding, construction and maintenance/operation of regional transportation infrastructures, both roads/bridges and transit, have historically been under the purview of provincial/state highway departments and transit authorities, respectively, and subject to little public scrutiny. With the rise of a new transportation paradigm that puts regional, integrated planning strategies back on the political agenda, regional planning organizations, municipal governments and citizens are now solicited to contribute to regional transportation strategies, which might or might not correspond to their local interests and ideals. In addition, the power and control exercised by transportation projects sponsors (most often times the province or the state) can trump the regional consensus. The new paradigm in transportation planning also calls for departments of transportation at all federal, provincial/state, and municipal levels to consider transportation options on an equal foot, break the roads/transit/land use siloes, and makes them subject to greater public scrutiny, which represent a major leap in changing the institutional and professional cultures. The issue of accountability is even more complex and challenging when transportation projects are built and managed.
through public-private partnerships because financial information can be subject to non-disclosure agreements.

Because planning for smart growth requires concentrating investments in certain areas and favouring certain modes of transportation over others (designated urban growth centers, transit, and bike/ped facilities versus suburban sprawling development and highways), being responsive to local preferences might not lead to the most sustainable policy and investment choices for the region. This is particularly true in less fragmented regions, where suburbanites have the greater weight in mayoral election outcomes. In all cases, the regional institutional design at the regional level, comprised of the mandate, the resources and the representational structure of the organization, helps explain and understand the extent of responsiveness to local preferences (aggregated at the regional level) and the lines of accountability between the citizen, the transit agency, the local governments, and the province/state government.

My presentation will be based upon the evidence collected in my empirical study of the 2005-2006 reforms of Toronto and Chicago regional planning institutions and their impacts on the planning process, transportation investments and land use decisions, which also assesses the trade-offs between the principles of accountability (responsibility and public scrutiny through transparency), democracy (representativeness, public debate and deliberation) and effectiveness (cost-efficiency and local and regional changes promoting sustainability) that the new regional institutions involve. More specifically, observations will be drawn from eight policy or investment decisions or “sub-cases” (four in each region): the Scarborough RT Replacement and Extension, the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, the Downtown Relief Line, and the Union Pearson Express in Toronto; and the Illiana Expressway, the Red Line South Extension, the CTA prioritization mechanism, and the TOD Ordinance in Chicago). Whereas some of these choices represent exemplary and desirable instances of responsiveness and accountability, others illustrate the challenges that regional transportation represents for the respect of the accountability principle. Although larger N studies would be required to generalize the patterns observed in my study, some observations are most likely transferable to regions with similar designs and frameworks.

16:30  Commentary by Alison Smith

17:00  Open discussion

17:15  Concluding remarks by Ruth Dassoneville
Do Responsiveness and Accountability matter at the municipal level?

MAY 18th

Workshop

8:00 Breakfast

Restaurant de l'Institut - ITHQ
3535 Rue Saint-Denis,
Montréal

For those who wish to participate, a breakfast will be held on the 18th. On that occasion, we propose to discuss the projects presented and to collaborate on new endeavors.

We plan to address:
1) The publication of texts ensued from the colloquium.
2) Future projects:
   what works should we join together.
   what ideas should we pursue work on.
3) Holding an annual reunion.
4) Etc…

Dinner Info

Restaurant Toroli
421 Rue Marie-Anne E,
Montréal

Dinner reservations were made for the 17th of May at 7pm.
The colloquium will be held at the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique.

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Sleeping arrangements have been made at the Hotel de l’Institut.

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